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Abstract 
 
The E3/EU-Iran negotiations on nuclear issues have been ongoing since summer 2003 
with the aim to find a balance between Iran’s desire to establish a peaceful nuclear 
enrichment programme and satisfying the safeguards of the international 
community against the possible development of a nuclear weapons programme. 
This paper provides an analysis of these negotiations and draws the conclusion that 
the E3, and later the E3/EU, have entered the negotiations with Iran without a clear 
strategy or alternative outcomes, focusing only on ‘getting what they want’. It 
argues that in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution, the E3/EU needs to 
take a more pro-active stand in preparing the pre-negotiations and negotiations. It 
will be important to find a common formula. The E3/EU needs to create a win-win 
situation and end the crisis before it is too late. 
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Introduction1 
 
After several years of failed negotiations and broken agreements, Iran on the one 
hand and Germany, France, the UK and Javier Solana (the E3/EU) on the other are 
still searching for a way to solve the disagreement over Iran’s nuclear activities.2 The 
role of the EU has been characterised by strong motives to continue the 
negotiations, and big efforts have been invested in keeping this initiative alive. 
However, a solution of the nuclear issues is yet to be found and the international 
community’s expectations of the EU are very high.  
 
In this paper I analyse the negotiations in order to identify some feasible steps or 
improvements that could lead to an operational and lasting solution to this conflict. 
The paper thus aims, firstly, to chart and examine what has happened so far in the 
negotiations and, secondly, to give recommendations on how the negotiations 
should be conducted in the future. By studying the negotiations from two different 
angles, namely the actors and the process, a comprehensive analysis will be carried 
out, leading to policy recommendations and conclusions.  
 
Since the issue at hand is very recent and indeed contemporary, one must be 
cautious when applying a particular ‘methodology’. Moreover, it is difficult to find 
persons willing to have an open discussion about the issue. Therefore, the analysis is 
mainly based on recent articles, policy papers and academic literature. It follows a 
pragmatic approach, and theory is mainly used as a conceptual reference point. 
The paper focuses on the Iranian and European stake-holders, meaning that other 
important actors such as the United States, Russia and China, as well as any events 
occurring after April 2007, remain outside the scope of this investigation.  
 
                                                 
1   Special thanks to Paul Meerts, Alireza Arfazadeh Roudsari and the persons willing to share 
experiences and information with me through conversations and interviews. This paper is 
dedicated to my family for always loving me, supporting me and believing in me.  
2    For a historical understanding of the relationship see S. Kile (ed.), Europe and Iran 
Perspectives on Non-proliferation, SIPRI Research Report, no. 21, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, pp. 1-21; Time to Talk: The Case for Diplomatic Solutions on Iran, 
www.pugwash.org/publication/tran/timetotalk.pdf, retrieved 22.4.2007; International Crisis 
Group, ‘Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?’, Middle East Report, no. 51, 23 
February 2006, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3976, retrieved 23.4.2007; 
International Crisis Group, ‘Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff?’, Middle East 
Briefing, no. 15, 24 November 2004, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3118&l=1, 
retrieved 23.4.2007. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows: the second and the third sections analyse the 
actors and the negotiating process, respectively; section four presents three possible 
scenarios for the future as well as policy recommendations, and the last section 
summarises the paper with conclusions.  
 
 
Analysis of the Actors 
 
Actors are very important in negotiations since the personal interaction of 
negotiators often makes the difference between failure and success of a 
negotiation.3  
 
The Approach of the E3/EU 
The nuclear debate between Iran and the EU is an unusual example of a three-way 
game. Besides the two actors talking, there is a ‘significant other’4, namely the 
United States, which has yet to be directly involved in the negotiations but 
nevertheless plays a very important role.  
                                                
 
When the E3 started to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue in 2003 it had a long 
tradition of dialogue with Iran.5 However, Sauer, amongst others, argues that the EU 
had the opportunity to take the lead in these important negotiations only because 
the Americans were not ready to break the isolation that they have pursued since 
1979. Iran even proposed a secret deal to the US but it was turned down.6 The 
Europeans could step in and become the main actors since the ‘significant other’ 
had chosen to stay outside.  
 
The comprehensive dialogue from 1998 has never officially been cancelled but the 
last meetings held with this broad approach took place in 2004-05. This might be 
 
3   P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, in W. Zartman & G.O. Faure (eds.), 
Escalation and Negotiation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 114. 
4   F. Heisbourg, ‘A European Perspective’, in Iran: the Moment of Truth, European Security 
Forum (ESF) Working Paper, no. 20, June 2005, p. 1. 
5   See amongst others G. Quille & R. Keane, ‘The EU and Iran: Towards a New Political and 
Security Dialogue’, in S. Kile, op. cit. 
6    T. Sauer, ‘Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: the Case of Iran’, Discussion Papers in 
Diplomacy,  no. 106, January 2007, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
Clingendael, p. 8. See also G. Kessler, ‘2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks’, 
The Washington Post, 14 February 2007. 
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explained by several reasons; one is that the non-proliferation issues have become 
prioritised7; another is that Iran has shown less and less interest in these debates. In 
the words of one European official, the comprehensive dialogue has ‘floated 
away’.8  
 
Germany’s position in the negotiations with Iran is interesting since it is the only 
country in the E3 that does not possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, it can relate to 
the Iranian criticism of the ‘double-standards’9 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and take the softest approach toward Iran on the nuclear 
issues.10 This approach even created public frictions with the two other countries of 
the trio.11 Another important aspect regarding the German role in the negotiations is 
the power the country has been given through them. As German aspirations to 
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council have not been achieved, 
Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier have worked hard to bring 
together the informal Contact Group12 and made sure that Germany has a say in 
the decisions of this group.13 T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  G e r m a n  g o v e r n m e n t  w i s h e s  t o  
maintain an important role in the negotiations, thus not losing the power offered by 
this opportunity.  
 
France has had a more complex relationship with Iran than Germany. By favouring 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, mostly through selling weapons to Saddam Hussein, 
tensions grew between the country and Iran during the 1980s and relations remain 
tense.14  
 
The United Kingdom has the most complicated relationship with Iran. The British used 
the election and re-election of Khatami in 1997 and 2001 as triggers for a policy shift 
toward Iran.15 It might be argued that the UK is using the Iranian case as a way of 
                                                 
7   S. Kutchesfahani, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Challenge and European Diplomacy’, EPC Issue Paper, 
no. 46, March 2006, p. 16. 
8   Interview with European official, Brussels, 2 May 2007. 
9   T. Sauer, op. cit., pp. 18f. 
10   Ibid. 
11   Ibid., p. 13. 
12  M. Overhaus, ‘European Diplomacy and the Conflict over Iran’s Nuclear Program’, 
Analytical Introduction to the Dossier, www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de, retrieved 27.4.2007. 
13   Ibid. 
14   R. Youngs, Europe and the Middle East – in the Shadow of September 11, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2006, p. 68. 
15   Ibid., p. 69. 
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finding a more pro-active role in the European context and as a driver for the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). However, as opposed to the St. Malo initiative, the British role is not a 
choice but rather a consequence of Iran’s high political priority as an actor in a 
region of great interest to the British.16 
 
Before the so-called Mykonos case17, Germany was the driving force in creating and 
maintaining relations with Iran. After the crisis, France took over this role.18 Since 2001 
the UK has become the most active actor. It is clear that the trio members have 
different roles influenced by their interests, foreign policy priorities and general 
attitude. Nevertheless, a consensus has been reached on the sensitive Iranian issue. 
Although there are differences in perception and economic interests, the main lines 
of policy are agreed upon.19  
 
There were several important implications for the actorness of the EU, when the latter 
was represented by the trio. Some argue that the three countries Germany, France 
and the UK began the negotiations as three individual states with their own 
interests.20 Others argue that the trio’s trip to Tehran was an example of them using 
the EU for their own motives but that this was a “flexible model of European 
actorness”21 or should be interpretated as “a new kind of decision-making model 
[that] saw the daylight with the EU-3 taking the lead”22 and the rest of the EU 
supporting them retroactively.23 The role of Javier Solana, the High Representative for 
the CFSP, was therefore to compromise; he became the ‘go-between’24 or the 
internal interlocutor.25 However, there are indications that it had already been 
                                                 
16   European diplomat, ibid.; K. Bayramzadeh, Les enjeux principaux des relations entre l’Iran 
et l’Europe de 1979 à 2003, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2004, p. 161. 
17   In the Mykonos case, high representatives of the Iranian government were found 
responsible for the murder of Kurdish opposition leaders in 1992. It was a Berlin appeal 
court that reached the verdict and, as a reaction, the European ambassadors were 
recalled from Tehran to underline the seriousness of this crime. See K. Bayramzadeh, op. 
cit., pp. 143 and 154; Kutchesfahani, op. cit., p. 16. 
18   S. Kutchesfahani, op. cit., p. 18. 
19   Ibid., p. 17. 
20   C. Ahlström, ‘The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in S. 
Kile (ed.), op. cit., pp. 28f. 
21   R. Youngs, op. cit., p. 92. 
22   T. Sauer, op. cit., p. 28.  
23   Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Doc. no. 14292/04, Brussels, 5 
November 2004.  
24   T. Sauer, op. cit., p. 10. 
25   Ibid., p. 28. 
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considered to include Solana from the start of the negotiations regarding the nuclear 
issue.26 Solana finally became part of the negotiation team in early 2004. By this time, 
he could be argued to have developed an understanding of the importance and 
complexity of the issue from the internal negotiations. This is important since he had 
to learn to handle three levels of interaction at the same time.27  
 
Some argue that the EU’s entire approach is an ad hoc solution. The flexible E3/EU 
format is a sensitive issue, especially since it relates to the nascent foreign policy of 
the Union. Yet, it has proven to function and that is the most important thing. 
“Anything that works”28 seems to be an appropriate way of describing the formula. 
The EU is eager to see E3/EU as the embodiment of the Union as a whole. This is 
evident from the Council constantly supporting and backing up the actions with a 
consensus on the process and conclusions. The 27 member states also recognised 
that they cannot handle the process as flexibly as needed and therefore the E3/EU 
formula should continue.29 Solana as a central figure of the negotiations seems to be 
a comfort for the more critical voices.30 Solana’s confidence and knowledge have 
given him the possibility not only to embody the CFSP but also to become the main 
negotiator of the wider international community on this issue.31 The combination of 
Solana being the representative of not only the E3, the other 24 countries, the Union 
as a whole but lately also of the five permanent members of the United Nations’ 
Security Council and Germany (P5+1), creates a new and dynamic process.32 
 
Iran's Political System33 
The implications of Iran’s political system, with its multipolar structure, are significant. 
“The best way to understand Iran’s foreign policy is to imagine a matrix with three 
                                                 
26   Ibid., p. 10; R. Youngs, op. cit., p. 79. Youngs argues that the E3 wanted to include Solana 
but avoided doing so since the trio did not want to give Berlusconi a prominent role. 
27   See below for a further development of this argument. 
28   European official, op. cit. 
29   Interview with European diplomat, Brussels, 3 April 2007. 
30   Ibid. 
31   Ibid. 
32   S. Kuchesfahani, op. cit., p. 85. 
33   For a deeper understanding of the political factions within the Iranian system see R. 
Takeyh,  Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, New York, Times 
Books/Henry Holt, 2006; S. Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Washington, D.C., Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006. 
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competing elements – Islamic ideology, national interests, and factional politics – all 
constantly at battle.”34  
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasised the right to nuclear 
technology for peaceful use.35 He too mentions the feelings of unfairness revealed 
by President Ahmadinejad in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 
2005.36 Yet there are signs that the Supreme Leader does not want to share the harsh 
tone of the President. In an interview with a French newspaper, the Supreme 
Leader’s advisor Velayati stated: “l’opinion internationale ne doit pas s’arrêter aux 
slogans agressifs de certains dirigeants: la seule parole qui compte, c’est elle du 
Guide […] Qu’il y ait plusieurs tonalités dans le discours de nos dirigeants montre, 
disons, que nous sommes un pays ouvert à la pluralité, mais il ne faut pas s’arrêter à 
cela. Sachez […] que le seul que ait la haute main sur les décisions dans ce 
domaine, comme dans toutes les grandes décisions stratégiques, en accord avec la 
Constitution, c’est le Guide suprême, M. Khamenei.“37  
 
These remarks clearly indicate that the President is not to be taken too seriously and 
that the one with the formal say is the Supreme Leader and no-one else. Up until 
mid-2006, the ideological conservative President Ahmadinejad and the chief 
negotiator Laridjani have had a strong and confident position on their nuclear 
strategy. In Velayati’s comments, there is an important emphasis on the Supreme 
Leader and his authority. This should be taken into consideration when analysing the 
further development of the negotiations. The context in which Velayati made these 
remarks is interesting; during February 2007, Khamenei started his own diplomatic 
initiative by sending his representatives to Russia, Europe and Saudi Arabia for talks, 
giving a message with conciliatory connotations.38 This might be interpretated as the 
Supreme Leader distancing himself from the strategy of Ahmadinejad.  
 
                                                 
34   R. Takeyh, op. cit., p. 4. 
35   International Crisis Group, ‘Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul‘, Middle East Briefing, 
no. 5, 5 August 2002, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1673, retrieved 
20.4.2007, p. 4; H. Balouji, ‘The Process of National Security Decision Making in Iran: the 
Signing of the Additional Protocol’, in S. Kile (ed.), op. cit., pp. 84f. 
36   S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 35. 
37   M. Decamps, ‘Iran: Le ton conciliant d’Ali Akbar Velayati / Ali Akbar Velayati presse les 
Européens de « tempérer les Etats-Unis »‘, Le Monde, 22 February 2007, pp. 1 and 5.  
38   R. Khalaf, ‘Iran Holds Nuclear Line after Diplomatic Flurry’, Financial Times, 18 February 
2007. 
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The newly created Strategic Council for Foreign Relations39 constrains Foreign 
Minister Mottaki, since two of his predecessors are watching over his moves, as well 
as the President since this new institution has to be taken into consideration when 
shaping policies. The strategies presented by it, if approved by Khamenei, have to 
be acted upon by all foreign policy-related bodies.40 
                                                
 
President Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005.41 For the international community 
the new President meant a less reliable Iran which would prove to further escalate 
the crisis.42 Ahmadinejad did reject the EU offer, restart the nuclear programme and 
appoint a more aggressive negotiating team,43 yet it is important to remember that 
his power regarding the nuclear issue is limited. The rhetoric of the President should 
be interpreted as a way of influencing an issue that is not within his direct 
competence. As Vakil argues, “We in the West have conflated Ahmadinejad’s 
powers […] He isn’t the Man of the year. He has very little influence in the Iranian 
system. We have created him.”44 Another important fact to keep in mind is that 
Ahmadinejad is creating a smokescreen with the nuclear issue, thus keeping the 
domestic public’s focus on another point than his undelivered social and economic 
promises.45  
 
The task of Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki and his ministry has been to “clarify 
the Iranian position on arms control and security issues”46, rather than actually 
negotiating. This has several possible reasons. One European diplomat spelled it out 
by saying that “[it is] striking how side-lined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is”47 in the 
 
39   See R. Lowe & C. Spencer (eds.), ‘Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis’, in A Middle 
East Programme Report, London, Chatham House, The Royale Institute of International 
Affairs, 2006, p. 10; B. Samii, ‘Iran: New Foreign Policy Council Could Curtail 
Ahmadinejad’s Power’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 June 2006, www.rferl.org/ 
featuresarticle/2006/06/ae0c686d-4809-4f2d-938e-8838f0ff6714.html, retrieved 5.4.2007. 
40   B. Samii, op. cit. 
41   See R. Lowe & C. Spencer, op. cit., p. 10; S. Kutchesfahani, op. cit., p. 18. 
42   S. Kutchesfahani, op. cit., p. 18. 
43    L. Mark, ‘Can EU Diplomacy Stop Iran’s Nuclear Programme?’, Centre for European 
Reform Working Paper, November 2005, p. 9.  
44   Sanam Vakil, cited in L. Savage, ‘Will Bush Bomb Iran: or Will the Charm Offensive that 
Worked on North Korea Work on Tehran as well?’, Maclean’s, 26 February 2007, p. 31. 
45   R. Khalaf, ‘Pride under Pressure: a Resurgent Iran Fears its Leader’s Defiance May 
Backfire’, Financial Times, 5 March 2007. 
46   H. Balouji, op. cit., p. 90. 
47   European diplomat, op. cit. 
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Iranian nuclear dossier. But he also continued by emphasising the fact that Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs usually have a weak position on issues regarding national security.48  
 
The chief negotiator appointed when the E3-Iran negotiations started in 2003 was 
Rowhani, acting as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). 
This meant that the file was moved to the “principle organ on security”49. This move is 
interpreted by authors as a “deliberate choice of the Iranian system to introduce the 
SNSC as the main focal point for reflecting the Iranian position”.50  One analysis 
reaches the conclusion that the choice to move the nuclear issues to the SNSC is a 
strategic move by the Supreme Leader to create a safety net for himself and the 
leading elite. By letting an institution like the SNSC take the sensitive decision on what 
will happen with the nuclear dossier, the leadership can avoid “taking the heat for 
controversial decisions”51 and use the consensus as a guarantee.  
 
When Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, Laridjani replaced Rowhani as the secretary 
of the SNSC, and became chief negotiator on the nuclear issues. He is assisted by a 
“negotiation team”.52 This choice was significant.53 Before becoming the head of the 
SNSC, Laridjani criticised his predecessor for being too generous when negotiating 
with the E3. The Financial Times cites Laridjani claiming that Rowhani had “swapped 
a pearl for a candy”54, when accepting to suspend uranium enrichment in 2003 and 
only getting promises on incentives in return. After nearly two years as negotiator, 
Laridjani is now in a very delicate situation and “finds himself at the centre of the 
gathering storm, with little practical help or public support for his position either at 
home or abroad.”55 
 
The internal decision-making process is highly complex and time-consuming, 
affecting Iran’s ability to react to a crisis. All different organs, with their own goals, 
                                                 
48   Ibid. 
49   S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 66. 
50   Former Foreign Minister Kharrazi paraphrased in H. Balouji, op. cit., p. 90. 
51   S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 37. 
52   Ibid., p. 82. 
53   Ibid., p. 37. 
54   G. Smyth & Q. Peel, ‘Spotlight: Ali Larijani, A Gathering Storm’, Financial Times, 16 
February 2007. 
55   Ibid. 
  11Sahar Arfazadeh Roudsari 
give their input to the process.56 As stated by a European diplomat, the time taken is 
a clear proof of the complexity of the system and also implies difficulties of knowing 
or predicting the possible outcome of the internal process.57 The same diplomat 
emphasised the difficulty of identifying “what is going on” at a certain point and 
argues that the shifts and cautions of the Iranians show that the political system and 
decision-making processes are a bigger factor with regard to Iran than other 
countries.58  
 
Finally, the Iranian people have a feeling of being victims of foreign interventions in 
the past and are proud of their country and its perceived cultural superiority; they 
want security and status.59 Although most Iranians support the quest for status and 
respect, they are not willing to pay too high a price for a nuclear programme. The 
economic and political implications of further isolation from the international 
community are strong reasons to stop backing the regime. However, in order to have 
an open and public debate on this issue, a critical evaluation of the situation is 
needed. This is arguably difficult when the leadership and political elite are 
determined to use the Iranian public as a bargaining chip in negotiating with the 
E3/EU.60  
 
 
Analysis of the Negotiation Process  
 
Negotiations are a sequence of stages that combine conflict resolution and 
cooperation by communications.61 The process can be defined as the “pattern of 
interaction”62 of the actors depending on their strategies and the context.  
 
                                                 
56    A. Maleki, Decision Making in Iran’s Foreign Policy: A Heuristic Approach, 
www.caspianstudies.com/article/Decision%20Making%20in%20Iran-FinalDraft.pdf, pp. 6f, 
retrieved 29.4.2007. 
57   European diplomat, op. cit. 
58   Ibid.  
59   ‘Dealing with Tehran, US Policy – Surrender and Then We Can Talk – Will Not Work’, 
Financial Times, 23 February 2007. 
60   S. Chubin, op cit., p. 29ff: see also S. Tisdall, ‘Inside the Struggle for Iran’, The Guardian, 30 
April 2007. 
61   C. Dupont & G.O. Faure, ‘The Negotiation Process’, in R. Avenhaus, V. Kremenuyk & G. 
Sjöstedt (eds.), Containing the Atom – International Negotiations and Nuclear Security 
and Safety, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2002, p. 40.  
62   R. Avenhaus, W. Kremenuyk & G. Sjöstedt, op. cit., p. 9. 
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Stages of the Negotiation Process 
There are two stages in the negotiation process: diagnosis and formulation. In the first 
step of a negotiation, diagnosis or pre-negotiations63, a common understanding of 
the problem needs to be established.64 Each party has to analyse and reach 
conclusions about their interests, goals and means for the negotiations and choose 
their strategy65 as well as analysing the other party.66 Negotiations are uncertain and 
therefore preparation is crucial since it is very difficult to exit the process once you 
have entered the negotiation phase itself.67  
 
Sauer claims that the 2003 negotiations were initiated with too much confidence 
and without proper preparation by the E3. The three countries arguably did not take 
into account the possibility of failure and the possible effects or consequences this 
would have had for the reputation of not only these three countries but also the EU 
as a whole.68 This way they became ‘entrapped’ in the negotiations even before the 
actual negotiations started by investing time and efforts without taking all possible 
outcomes into consideration.69 It might be argued that the E3 and later E3/EU have 
entrapped themselves more and more in the course of the negotiations through 
“small, step-by-step decisions that result in a step-by-step loss of room for 
maneuver”.70 However, some authors seem to argue that the EU should continue the 
negotiations even though this means entrapment. “The EU-3 has invested 
considerable time and effort in Iran and should therefore, not least for the sake of its 
credibility, leave the door open to diplomacy and dialogue.”71 The E3 Foreign 
Ministers went to Iran, acknowledging the sign of respect that would be appreciated 
by the Iranians.72 However, one might question whether the Europeans took the 
complexity of the Iranian system as well as the Iranian motives into consideration.  
 
                                                 
63   W. Zartman, ‘Conflict Resolution and Negotiations’,  draft [prepared for the Sage 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution, London, Sage, 2008] in Workbook by P. Meerts, study 
material at the College of Europe, 2007, p. 6. 
64   P. Kotzian, ‘Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: on the Application of 
the Frame-Selection Model and its Implications’, International Political Science Review, 
vol. 28, no. 1, 2007, p. 82. 
65   W. Zartman, op. cit., p. 6. 
66   P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, op. cit., p.106. 
67   Ibid.  
68   T. Sauer, op. cit., p. 28. 
69   P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, op. cit. 
70   Ibid., p. 105. 
71   S. Kutchesfahani, op. cit., p. 20. 
72   Interview with Tim Guldimann, Bruges, 28 February 2007. 
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The Iranians can be criticised for not fully taking into account the possibilities of the 
negotiations. It might be argued that the Iranians still do not have a strategy that 
addresses all aspects of the crisis. A possibility that was used by Rowhani’s 
negotiation team was to have cessation or suspension as a bargaining chip to trade 
for incentives and promises by the E3. But since Laridjani came to power it appears 
that the strategy has been revised and this has led to a more difficult situation for the 
Iranians. 
 
In the second step of the process, formulation73, a formula with a common definition 
of the problem and its solution as well as a common sense of justice and possible 
trade-offs is to be found. “Establishing a satisfying formula is the key to a subsequent 
agreement”74 and therefore an emphasis should be put on finding this formula. 
‘Bargaining negotiations’ are negotiations where the actors follow “a logic of 
consequentialism”75  and have fixed preferences, power and information. In this 
frame, the actors are motivated by their self-interest and the outcome of the 
negotiations reflects interests and power.76 I argue that the Iranian negotiation frame 
is a bargaining one, especially concerning achieving own interests. The negotiation 
style of Iran illustrates a tendency to try to win every round and renegotiate 
agreements so that they better fit into the country’s own preferences.77 Chubin even 
argues that some narcissism can be tracked in the way the Iranians have been 
negotiating so far.78  
 
‘Arguing negotiations’ on the other hand follow “the logic of appropriateness”79 and 
are described as actors focusing on what is appropriate in a given situation more 
than what the consequences of this might be. In this frame, the long-term 
perspectives are more present and problem-solving, emphasis on discourse, learning, 
norms and arguments are used, rather than demands or threats. Given the EU’s sui 
generis nature and its internal culture of negotiation and cooperation, I argue that 
the Union uses this frame more than the ‘bargaining negotiations’.80 However, it is 
                                                 
73   W. Zartman, op. cit., p. 6.  
74   Ibid. 
75   P. Kotzian, op. cit., p. 80. 
76   Ibid.  
77   S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 64. 
78   Ibid. 
79   P. Kotzian, op. cit., p. 81. 
80   P. Meerts, ‘European Union Negotiations’, in P. Meerts & F. Cede (eds.), Negotiating 
European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 224.  
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important to keep in mind that ‘arguing negotiations’ have several preconditions 
that most be fulfilled. Mutual trust, a shared perception of the problem and a setting 
that accepts all parties as equals are some of these preconditions.81 If the EU is using 
this frame even when negotiating with other parties, these preconditions need to be 
fulfilled as well.  
 
Some sources appear to allude to these issues. In an interview with a European 
official, the issue of culture and understanding the other was brought up. The 
pragmatic view of this official was that the Union should find the common ground 
and interest of the two parties (Iran and the EU) and build on this rather than 
understanding everything about Iran and how culture affects the negotiations. This 
remark reveals a misunderstanding of the different frames used by the two parties; 
something that clearly affects the negotiations.82 By being inward-looking and using 
the frame that works within the context, trust and internal process of the Union for 
external negotiations, the EU is not creating a formula that works in the negotiations 
with Iran. It is true that the negotiations with Iran are approached as an ongoing 
process instead of talks with a clear ending but it is questionable whether there is an 
understanding that the Iranians are actually using a different frame than what is used 
by the E3/EU.  
 
One-shot negotiations are more likely to have a ‘bargaining frame’, while the 
‘arguing frame’ tends to evolve in long-term interactions.83 According to Zartman, 
the malfunction of the formula will lead to a slower, less coherent and less 
satisfactory resolution of the conflict. Thus it might be argued that one of the reasons 
why both the Tehran and the Paris agreement broke down was the failure to find 
one frame and formula that worked for both parties.84  
 
                                                 
81   P. Kotzian, op. cit., p. 82. 
82   European official, op. cit. 
83   P. Kotzian, op. cit., p. 95. 
84   W. Zartman, op. cit., p. 7. In the 2003 Tehran agreement with the E3 foreign ministers, Iran 
agreed to fully cooperate with the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and voluntarily 
suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. In the 2004 Paris agreement, 
the E3/EU offered Iran a guaranteed nuclear power fuel supply and far-reaching 
economic incentives if it demonstrated that it was not aiming at developing nuclear 
weapons. 
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Individual Actors 
Negotiations depend heavily on an exchange of information, signals, messages and 
arguments between the negotiators.85  
 
On a personal level, Solana’s time and efforts in the negotiations have developed 
into a question of prestige.86 The emotional part of the process of negotiations is very 
important since the negotiators are tied to the outcome of the negotiations.87 Solana 
has invested a lot of status in the negotiations (perhaps more than he should have). 
By doing so, he has prevented a loss of face but he has also entrapped himself into 
the success or failure of the negotiations.88 Thus his inflexibility when it comes to his 
position, status and face makes him more likely to continue the effort to talk to 
Laridjani although it might be a dead end. This also makes him more vulnerable to 
emotional blackmailing through threats of a breakdown of negotiations. A 
diplomatic solution of the nuclear issues would become a big feather in the hat of 
the man who represents the EU, the international community and himself in these 
negotiations.  
 
Laridjani, on the other hand, has his own personal goals and problems regarding the 
negotiations. The critical approach toward Rowhani has been toned down and 
Laridjani has even become closer than expected to Solana. Knowing that he has an 
important role to play, Laridjani is entrapped as well. His problem is to balance the 
wish of having a full fuel cycle and at the same time avoiding international criticism 
and crisis. Domestically, it has been easier to legitimise having negotiations with the 
E3/EU since the European Union has a more neutral and positive connotation for 
Iranians than certain other states.89 In the international arena, it is more difficult to 
keep the interests of Iran on the agenda and accepted as legitimate, especially 
since the international community, including countries like Russia and China, has 
aligned itself to the offer made to the Iranians. This is a clear-cut example of a two-
level game, described by Putnam.90 The national level for Laridjani is by far as 
                                                 
85   C. Dupont & G.O. Faure, op. cit., p. 41.  
86   T. Guldimann, op. cit. 
87   P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, op. cit., p. 109. 
88   Ibid. 
89   S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 66; and European diplomat, op. cit. 
90   R. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization, no. 42, no. 3, 1998; and P. Kotzian, op. cit., p. 81.  
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complicated as the domestic level for Solana.91 As the only ‘formal link’92 between 
the two levels, the chief negotiator is not just an ‘honest broker’ but also has his own 
personal agenda. Laridjani faces a delicate situation as he can be removed from his 
position at any given moment. He is ‘torn’ between the different bodies of power in 
the Iranian system.  
 
The strong relationship that seems to have developed between Solana and Laridjani 
can be seen as one of the determining factors of whether the negotiations succeed 
or fail.93 It might be argued that it is difficult to have direct relations with the Supreme 
Leader and therefore any party wishing to negotiate with Iran needs to identify and 
build a personal and trusting relationship with the people ‘close to the power’.94 In 
this sense, being close to Laridjani is a good thing for Solana as this is the only way to 
build the trust needed for any concessions to be made. Without reciprocal trust and 
political will, no negotiations can be successful.95 Laridjani still has the confidence to 
be the driving force to make the Iranians accept a possible deal.  
 
I t  c a n  a l s o  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  h a v i n g  o n e  n e g o t i a t o r  f r o m  e a c h  p a r t y ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e  
Solana as the P5+1 negotiator and Laridjani as his Iranian counterpart, is a positive 
development for the negotiations and for the creation of a functioning relationship 
to build upon. Although the Iranian case clearly has shown the internal fight for 
power, it is still possible to claim that Laridjani can work as the go-between that 
Solana is for the EU and the international community. This is a very important fact 
since the negotiations between Iran and E3/EU do not aspire to have an end. The 
aim is not to reach an outcome with an ending but rather to begin a dialogue of 
continuous cooperation and relations between the two parties. “Conflict resolution 
approaches, where parties not only conduct forward-looking negotiations to take 
care of future possible conflict but where they also seek to build mechanisms for 
building transforming relationships.”96  This is possible to argue since EU officials 
emphasise the use of open suggestions, possible to negotiate on, rather than 
packages of incentives when describing Solana’s propositions to Iran.97 The same 
                                                 
91   See above. 
92   R. Putnam, op. cit., p. 456. 
93   P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, op. cit., p. 114. 
94   G. Quille & R. Keane, op. cit., p. 120.  
95   W. Zartman, op. cit., p. 3.  
96   Ibid., p. 10. 
97   European official, op. cit. 
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source points to the possibility of having a wider debate and negotiations with Iran 
as soon as the nuclear issue has been resolved. The relationship between Iran and EU 
is described as having significant potential, but since the nuclear issues have 
overshadowed all other concerns it has to be solved before other negotiations can 
take the place and space they need.98  
 
Respect 
For the Iranians, the issue of respect, and more importantly “mutual respect”99, has 
been a key phrase during the negotiations. The ‘honour’ made by the three Foreign 
Ministers of the most powerful European countries when coming to Tehran was 
greatly appreciated by the Iranian leadership and could be used vis-à-vis the 
domestic public as proof of Iran’s increasing importance.100 The respect the Iranians 
demand can also be traced to trying to save their faces. Possible concessions will 
depend deeply on the possibility to have face maintenance.101 Introducing 
voluntary suspensions as confidence building, while negotiating with the international 
community, can clearly be seen as a way of agreeing with the E3/EU but still not 
loosing face. There are indications pointing toward a tiredness or unwillingness from 
the E3/EU side regarding the issue of respect. As one European diplomat bluntly put 
it: “Is this ‘code’ for ‘you are not giving us what we want?’”102 The same source states 
that the issue is not whether or not Iran is respected but more about the others 
having confidence in Iran or not. Further, he emphasises the importance of 
negotiations to be able to create trust and confidence on both sides. However, 
others claim that the Europeans are close to the Americans on the issue of respect. 
Sauer states that “there seems to be a lack of empathy for feelings of prestige, 
respect and other non-quantifiable values that exists in other parts of the world.”103 
The Europeans can argue to have a more nuanced framework in their guidelines 
and approach towards the Iranians.104 The psychological consequences might be 
hard to show on paper but obviously affect the way further dialogue will evolve.  
                                                 
98   Ibid. 
99   T. Guldimann, op. cit. 
100  Ibid. 
101  C. Dupont & G.O. Faure, op. cit., p. 51. 
102  European diplomat, op. cit. 
103  T. Sauer, op. cit. p. 27. 
104    An example is the vocabulary of “Iran’s support for extremist groups” used by the 
Europeans when discussing terrorism, compared to the American usage of “terrorist 
groups” in Iran. See M. Sariolghalam, Justice for All, p. 122, www.twq.com/01summer/ 
sariolghalam.pdf, retrieved 25.4.2007. 
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Rhetoric and Time 
The rhetoric of Ahmadinejad has had a deteriorating effect on the process and the 
negotiations. One European official claims that the President’s use of great words, 
poetic synonyms and metaphors has created misunderstanding between the EU and 
Iran since the culture and tradition that these examples refer to is different from the 
European one. It is important to keep in mind that poetic usage and illustrations are 
part of Iranian culture and most Iranians can give long citations of poems and other 
mythological texts by heart since they are part of the national heritage and 
identity.105 Since many speeches made by the President are directed to the 
domestic public, his choice of words should also be analysed from that point of view.  
 
The concept of time, when negotiating as an Iranian, is different from Western 
culture. This is very interestingly described by Vakil: “You don’t go into the bazaar 
and say this is what I want […] You can’t be afraid to walk away, and then, in the 
11th hour, the man will make you an offer. […] Anglo-saxons like to sell things right 
away-cash! […] Their negotiating position is that everything has to be done today 
before we move forward.”106 These differences and cultural nuances are, of course, 
very important in negotiations. The Iranian way of always trying to include or exclude 
parts from an agreement in the last minute might be connected to the offers made 
in the 11th hour or interpreted as a way of prolonging negotiations since they have 
not been taking enough time. This aspect deserves more knowledge and focus from 
the European side. Some might argue that the negotiations with Iran are taking too 
much time and have been slow107, but from a negotiating point of view, time and 
repetition creates opportunities to shape a better relationship and understanding of 
the other party. It also gives time to create trust and channels of communication that 
might improve the possibilities and outcomes of the negotiation in a positive way.108  
 
Iran’s Strategy 
It is hard to track down a clear strategy on the Iranian side. The main goal of the 
negotiations seems to have a full fuel cycle and yet not face an international crisis 
and isolation. It is interesting to see that the Iranian strategy has changed depending 
                                                 
105  Iran, Country database of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
www.landguiden.se.till.biblextern.sh.se, retrieved 9.5.2007. 
106  Vakil, cited in L. Savage, op. cit., p. 31. 
107  Amongst others S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 107.  
108  P. Meerts, ‘Entrapment in International Negotiations’, op. cit., p. 112.  
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on Tehran’s sense of confidence and the parties of the talks.109 The strategy of 
cooperation and voluntary confidence building that was apparent in the beginning 
of the negotiations was replaced by a more confrontational approach in 2005 and 
this still seems to be the case.  
 
The overall strategy can be characterised as the Iranians trying to build confidence 
and at the same time trying to win every round. The negotiations have been 
approached as “a contest of wills rather than an opportunity to reach common 
ground through reciprocal compromise”.110 T h e  I r a n i a n s  h a v e  a l s o  t i e d  t h e i r  o w n  
hands in several talks by turning certain aspects into non-negotiable issues, such as 
justice and rights. Emphasising legal rights has overshadowed the political nature of 
the problem and led to miscalculations and interpretations that are not seen as 
logical by the international community.111 This has created a difficult situation. The 
actual cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and the E3/EU has been weakened by the 
tendency to always “seek a foot in the door”112. When analysing the Tehran and 
Paris agreements and the reasons why they fell apart, it is possible to identify an 
Iranian tendency to exclude certain parts or re-define issues. It might be seen as a 
“stop-and-go strategy”113 that has led to problems of trust and reassurance.114 The 
uncertainty resulting from the Iranian strategy of reopening agreements, creating or 
exploiting loopholes, having their own deadlines and making last-minute demands 
has been counterproductive.115 The Iranians have tried to show great negotiating 
skills by using these tactics but their credibility has diminished and the international 
community has lost patience. The benefit of doubt is no longer given to the Iranians, 
even from the European side, and this is, of course, not a good result.116 According 
to Rowhani, his negotiating team (2002-2005) frequently used the strategy of delay 
and misrepresentations with the Europeans117, giving some indications that the 
Iranians in fact knew that they were using a strategy that might backfire. The 
                                                 
109  Amongst others S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 64.  
110  Ibid., p. 80. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid., p. 68. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Ibid., pp. 68f. 
115  One example of this is the Iranian choice to reply to the Vienna proposal at the end of 
August instead of July, leading to the adoption of the UNSC resolution 1737. 
116  S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 70.  
117  R. Lowe & C. Spencer, op. cit., p. 15.  
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consequence of the chosen strategy seems to be that the Iranians have a lot of work 
to do in re-building the trust needed from the international community.118  
                                                
 
The E3/EU’s Strategy 
The European strategy is driven by the European motives of being the main actor 
and keeping the role of the Union as an important actor alive. The approach has 
been diplomatic and very patient and without hurry.119 The important goal has been 
to keep the talks going by not rejecting but rather studying, evaluating and coming 
up with new proposals whenever setbacks occur. Time and confidence building 
have been two characteristics of the European strategy. Many emphasise the 
European line of being willing to talk but yet tough enough to set red lines.120 From a 
European point of view, keeping a united stand has been very important as well as 
keeping both Iran and the US within reach. The approach of negotiations or 
sanctions has been kept, and that way the E3/EU has been able to please the 
Americans, while giving the Iranians the possibility to choose cooperation or 
confrontation. The place left for manoeuvres when the Iranians did not suspend their 
enrichment was very limited, “the problem is political but the solution is technical, 
and the only technical solution we have found is cessation”.121 However, the 
negotiations are “three-way negotiations between EU and Iran, EU and US and 
indirectly Iran and US”122. This means that the Europeans have as much negotiations 
to do with their ally and within the Union itself as with Iran since positions need to be 
coordinated regularly. Since 2006 and the creation of the P5+1 two other strong and 
important actors are directly involved in these negotiations: Russia and China. 
Hence, Solana faces the challenge of keeping the whole international community 
aligned and backing up the strategy that is presented to Iran. Although this strategy 
has been functioning for a while, it is important to keep in mind that a lot of effort 
and energy has been invested to create and maintain the international community’s 
consensus and to keep the coalition alive.  
 
 
118  S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 71. 
119  Ibid., p. 107. 
120  Ibid.; and M. Leonard, op. cit., p. 23.  
121  S. Chubin, op. cit., p. 105. 
122  Ibid., p. 103. 
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Future Scenarios and a Policy Recommendation 
 
I will give three hypothetical scenarios on how the negotiations may proceed in the 
near future based on assumptions that are directly emanating from the analytical 
work presented in the previous sections.  
 
In the first scenario the ‘significant other’, namely the US, decides to directly engage 
in the negotiations with Iran and a normalisation of the relationship occurs in the long 
run. This may happen but remains unlikely.123 It would have serious implications for 
the E3/EU and their role in the negotiations. Some sources argue that direct talks 
would lead to a positive dynamic and interesting results and that other actors such 
as the E3/EU as well as Russia and China would nevertheless not be side-lined.124 
Rather, bilateral talks with the US are part of the package and process but not the 
goal of the negotiations.125 Other sources argue that the Iranians are more interested 
in a relationship with and guarantees by the US than anything else.126 As put by 
Leonard, “one European negotiator has compared the talks with Iran to a cocktail 
party, where the person you are talking to continuously looks over your shoulder to 
catch the eye of someone more important. That VIP is the United States”.127 The EU 
should therefore be satisfied with having only a bridging role in the nuclear 
negotiations and put more focus on other negotiations and possibilities that might be 
opened once the nuclear issues are resolved.128  
                                                
 
The second scenario implies a continuation of the road of negotiations. This would 
mean a re-start of the negotiations and most probably some sort of “dual 
suspension”129, meaning that the Iranians would suspend enrichment and the E3/EU 
would convince the international community to suspend further deterioration of the 
Iranian case in the UNSC. The role of the E3/EU would be to continue to represent the 
P5+1 and negotiate with Iran in order to find a workable solution. Preconditions 
would probably be used to allow both sides to save face and continue talking. It 
may also be feasible to have a diplomatic solution if a better deal or package was 
 
123  Ibid. 
124  European diplomat, op. cit. 
125  Ibid. 
126  European official, op. cit. 
127  M.  Leonard,  Crunch-time on Iran: Five Ways Out of a Nuclear Crisis, p. 4, 
markleonard.net/thinktank, retrieved 29.4.2007. 
128  European official, op. cit. 
129  Ibid. 
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presented. Such a package would include security guarantees as well as a possible 
compromise between the Iranian desire for enrichment and the international 
community’s fear that enrichment may be used to develop a nuclear bomb.  
 
If any of the parties chose not to negotiate or re-open the negotiations, the third 
scenario would be realised. In this case, the negotiations would stop and the 
probable outcome would be a tougher tone from the P5+1. The UNSC track is 
irreversible if the negotiations break down. Further resolutions would be implemented 
and stricter sanctions imposed. The E3/EU has already agreed to go down this road 
but it is doubtful whether they are prepared to walk it to the end, knowing that one 
possible outcome is a military strike. Even if UNSC actions would be unlikely to occur, 
due to Russian and Chinese interests, the American pressure and demands on 
Europe for something to happen would increase. For international negotiations, this 
scenario is the worst-case scenario since it would mean the end of a long period of 
invested time and effort to have a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear issues. The 
public slap-down for Iran and the country’s loss of face would make a return to the 
negotiation table much less evident.130 Yet the sanctions so far have created a 
domestic Iranian debate that might be encouraged further if negotiations were to 
break down.131 Maybe this could turn into a push for an Iranian return to 
negotiations.  
                                                
 
I argue that the second scenario is the best possible one for both the Iranians and 
the European Union. There is a clear interest for both parties to continue or re-start 
negotiations and this might be possible if the right formula can be found to start talks 
about having negotiations. This is a two-step process, with pre-negotiations and 
negotiations, meaning that different conditions and solutions can be combined 
depending on how far the process has reached. The dual suspension is a 
fundamental part of this formula. A ‘new’ form or label for the negotiations is 
probably necessary to legitimise the talks from both sides, a demand that has 
already been raised by the Iranians on several occasions.132 From the E3/EU side, it is 
important to find a common framework, possibly by changing the settings or by using 
new or innovative solutions and rhetoric for sensitive issues. Together with the 
complex relationship between the two actors and the US, a new model is needed to 
 
130  European diplomat, op cit. 
131  See above. 
132  Laridjani paraphrased by European diplomat, op. cit. 
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incorporate all interests and motives and find a workable formula and prerequisites 
for a solution of the nuclear issues. A more pro-active stand should be taken so that 
the mistakes of initiating negotiations without an understanding of the counterpart or 
not having a common framework are not repeated. If a mutually acceptable 
solution regarding the nuclear aspirations of Iran and the red lines of the international 
community can be found regarding sensitive issues like suspension, time-frames, level 
of activities and enrichment as well as modalities for control, the step to full 
egotiations and a positive outcome is not as far as it is sometimes claimed. 
onclusions 
untry as well as its national and 
ligious identity must be kept in mind by Europeans.  
n
 
 
C
 
This paper sought to analyse the international negotiations taking place between 
Iran and the E3/EU on the nuclear issue. An analysis of the internal decision-making 
process and motives of both parties offers useful information on who is being served 
by what decisions and what strategies. With the election of Ahmadinejad it was 
possible to trace important changes in the Iranian approach and consequences for 
the negotiations. Important lessons should be learnt so that a new or surprising move 
would not create the same setback in the negotiations as in 2005. Subsequently, I 
showed that it is important to know the political system and the internal decision-
making process of Iran, in order to negotiate with the country in an effective way. 
Efforts should be invested in understanding Iran as a proud country built on long-
lasting culture and traditions. This self-image of the co
re
 
I have argued that there is a discrepancy in the frameworks used for the 
negotiations. The Iranians use a ‘bargaining frame’ characterised by self-interest and 
an outcome of the negotiations reflecting interests and power. The negotiation style 
of Iran illustrates a tendency to try to ‘win’ every round and renegotiate agreements 
so that they fit better with the country’s own preferences. The Europeans, on the 
other hand, use an ‘arguing frame’, focusing on what is appropriate more than what 
the consequences might be. This frame has several preconditions that must be 
fulfilled, including trust and a culture of cooperation that the E3/EU has due to its own 
internal negotiation process. This discrepancy can explain the breakdowns of the 
negotiations with Iran so far, such as the failure of the Tehran agreement in 2003. If 
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the E3/EU wants to have fruitful negotiations with Iran, it might have to find a way to 
assimilate the two frames or to find a common framework. Bearing in mind the 
complex relationship between the two actors and the US, I have claimed that a new 
model for negotiations is needed to find a workable formula and prerequisites for a 
solution of the nuclear issues. It is possible to draw the conclusion that the E3 and 
later the E3/EU have entered negotiations with Iran regarding the nuclear issues 
without a clear strategy or alternative outcomes, focusing only on ‘getting what they 
want’. “If we do not risk, we cannot win”133 were the words used by one European 
official. The question is whether you can enter the game without calculating the 
osts and possible losses?  
 longer 
ad the confidence of the international community to negotiate with Iran?   
, the 
3/EU needs to create a win-win situation and end the crisis before it is too late. 
 
                                                
c
 
Linked to this issue is the argument that all the main actors have invested too much 
e f f o r t a n d  p r e s t ig e  i n  th e s e  n e g o t ia t io n s  to  b e  a b l e  to  s to p  th e m  if  n e c e s s a ry .  I n 
theoretical terms, they have been entrapped in the negotiations and they do not 
want to lose face, status and reputation by failing. This might be analysed as 
something positive since it means that the negotiators would want the negotiations 
or attempts to re-start negotiations to come about. However, it might also become 
problematic if inexplicable changes occur. What would happen if Solana no
h
 
In order to influence further negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue and other 
external affairs negotiations, the EU needs to improve its abilities and learn from the 
negotiations conducted with Iran. To reach a mutually acceptable solution, the 
E3/EU needs to take a more pro-active stand in preparing the pre-negotiations and 
negotiations. This way, the mistakes of initiating negotiations without a deep 
understanding of the counterpart or not having a common framework are not 
repeated. It will be important to find a common formula, possibly by changing the 
setting or using new, innovative solutions and rhetoric for sensitive issues. In order to 
solve the nuclear issues and create a good base for further relations with Iran
E
 
133  European official, op. cit. 
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